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Abstract 
This paper reviews the current level and pattern of access to finance for India’s rural poor and examines 
some of the key microfinance approaches in India, taking a close look at the most dominant among these, 
the Self Help Group (SHG) Bank Linkage initiative. It empirically analyzes the success with which SHG 
Bank Linkage has been able to reach the poor, examines the reasons behind this, and the lessons learned. 
The analysis in the paper draws heavily on a recent rural access to finance survey of 6,000 households in 
India, undertaken by the authors. The main findings and implications of the paper are as follows: India’s 
rural poor currently have very little access to finance from formal sources. Microfinance approaches have 
tried to fill the gap. Among these, the growth of SHG Bank Linkage has been particularly remarkable, but 
outreach remains modest in terms of the proportion of poor households served. The paper recommends that, 
if SHG Bank Linkage is to be scaled-up to offer mass access to finance for the rural poor, then much more 
attention will need to be paid towards: the promotion of high quality SHGs that are sustainable, clear 
targeting of clients, and ensuring that banks linked to SHGs price loans at cost-covering levels. At the same 
time, the paper argues that, in an economy as vast and varied as India’s, there is scope for diverse 
microfinance approaches to coexist. Private sector microfinanciers need to acquire greater professionalism, 
and the government, too, can help by creating a flexible architecture for microfinance innovations, 
including through a more enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework. Finally, the paper argues that, 
while microfinance can, at minimum, serve as a quick way to deliver finance to the poor, the medium-term 
strategy to scale-up access to finance for the poor should be to ‘graduate’ microfinance clients to formal 
financial institutions. The paper offers some suggestions on what it would take to reform these institutions 
with an eye to improving access for the poor.      
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Since the early national plans, successive governments in independent India have emphasized the 
link between improving access to finance and reducing poverty, a stance that has had influence 
globally.
1, 
2  The need to improve financial access for India’s poor, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are concentrated in rural areas,
 3 motivated the establishment of a vast network of rural 
cooperative credit banks in the 1950s, followed by a drive to nationalize commercial banks, 
launched in 1969.  This led to thousands of new bank branches in rural areas across the country.  
The strategy during the 1970s and 1980s gave the lead role to the nationalized (state-owned) 
commercial banks, who were charged with loosening the grip of traditional informal sector 
moneylenders through the use of targeted low-priced loans. The 1990s saw the partial 
deregulation of interest rates, increased competition in the banking sector, and new microfinance 
approaches, most notably, a nationwide attempt, pioneered by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and now supported by the state, to create links between commercial banks, NGOs, and 
informal local groups (‘self-help groups’, or SHGs).  Better known as ‘SHG Bank Linkage’, this 
approach has grown dramatically over the past decade, and while its outreach is still modest in 
terms of the proportion of poor households served, many believe it is destined to become the 
country’s dominant system of mass-outreach banking for the poor.  However, informal sector 
lenders remain a strong presence in rural India, delivering finance to the poor, the vast majority of 
whom still do not have access to either formal or semi-formal (microfinance) sectors.  Scaling-up 
access to finance for India’s rural poor, to meet their diverse financial needs (savings, credit, 
insurance against unexpected events, etc.) through flexible products at competitive prices, 
presents a formidable challenge in a country as vast and varied as India. But the opportunities, 
too, are plentiful, and government has an important role to play in creating space and a flexible 
architecture for innovations.  
 
This paper begins with a brief review in Section II of the current level and pattern of access to 
formal finance for India’s rural households, with a focus on the poor.  The review draws on a 
recent survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research, India (NCAER) - the Rural Finance Access Survey, 2003 (RFAS-2003). It 
highlights inadequacies in rural access to formal finance and the extortionary terms of informal 
finance, which provide a strong need and ample space for innovative microfinance approaches— 
that combine the safety and reliability of formal finance with the convenience and flexibility of 
informal finance—to serve the financial needs of India’s rural poor.  Section III examines some 
of the key microfinance initiatives in India over the past decade.  Section IV takes a closer look at 
the most dominant among the recent microfinance approaches, SHG Bank Linkage.  It evaluates 
the success with which this approach has been able to reach out to the poor, analyzes the reasons 
                                                           
1 The focus on poverty and finance was articulated most famously in the 1954 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
report on the All-India Rural Credit Survey of 1951-52 (RBI, 1954).  
2 For a good discussion on the link between finance and poverty see Rajan and Zingales (2003). For a 
discussion on the  microeconomic underpinnings of the welfare implications of improved access to 
financial intermediation, see World Bank (2003a). 
3 Of the estimated 260 million Indians (or 26% of the population) who live in poverty, some 193 million (or 
74%) live in rural areas. Another 180 million rural people are “near poor”. A majority of these households 
are marginal or small farmers, and the poorest households are landless.   2
 
behind its success and lessons learned, and identifies the main issues and concerns in scaling-up. 
Section V concludes by providing some suggestions on what needs to be done to scale-up access  
to finance for India's rural poor.   
   3
 
II. Access to Finance for the Poor: Some Evidence
4 
 
2.1 The Current Level and Pattern of Access  to Formal Finance 
 
India has a deep financial system.  Financial assets in India amount to about US$430 billion, in 
nominal terms, compared to less than US$250 billion in Argentina, US$330 billion in Malaysia, 
or US$386 billion in Mexico, despite India’s significantly lower per capita income.  The share of 
financial assets in GDP in India is about 93%, compared to 81% in Argentina and 68% in 
Mexico.  (Table 1). 
  

































Credit / GDP 
(%) 
Brazil  780,739  39.0  17.0 40.9 8.9 139.7 4,350  50.9
Argentina  231,166  44.0  2.1 11.8 1.0 81.0 7,550  24.2
México  386,366  24.7  7.9 9.2 2.1 68.3 4,440  32.3
India  437,293  34.2  104.7 21.8 0.4 92.8 440  36.4
China  2,153,717  42.5  66.8 19.5 8.5 199.4 780  128.9
Malaysia  331,302  146.5  65.5 29.6 50.0 370.9 3,390  144.8
Korea  1,091,499  64.7  233.1 16.9 45.1 267.0 8,490  140.3
*Simplified definition based on aggregate of assets described in this table.  
Sources: World Development Indicators; IFS;  IFC - Emerging Markets Database; BIS 
 
Financial depth is attributable in large part to India’s vast network of financial institutions, 
including those focused on rural customers. The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid expansion of 
India’s financial system into rural areas. Following Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalization drive, 
launched in 1969, commercial banks were required to open rural branches and, between 1973 and 
1985, bank branches in rural areas grew at an average of 15.2% each year, about double the 
growth rate of branches in semi-urban (6.4%), urban (7.8%) and metropolitan (7.5%) areas. 
Today, India has over 32,000 rural branches of commercial banks and regional rural banks 
(RRBs), some 14,000 cooperative bank branches, 98,000 primary agricultural credit societies 
(PACS), not to speak of the thousands of mutual fund sellers, several non-bank finance 
companies (NBFCs) and a large post office network with 154,000 outlets that are required to 
focus on deposit mobilization and money transfers. 
                                                           
4 For a more detailed discussion of the current level and pattern of access to finance in India, see World 
Bank (2004).   4
 
 
Not  surprisingly,  India  compares  
favorably with other developing 
countries in terms of the distribution of 
financial services.  The average 
population served per commercial bank 
branch in India was around 15,000 in 
2002, and including the branches of 
rural cooperative banks, at 12,800, 
close to levels in Indonesia and Mexico.  
Also in terms of the average area 
served per branch, India compares 
favorably with other countries, 
indicating a high degree of physical 
branch presence, which has been improving over time. (Figure 1). India’s performance with 
respect to insurance penetration is also better than countries like Brazil and China. Measured by 
insurance premium as a percentage of GDP, insurance penetration in India in 2000 was close to 
2.5%, compared to a little over 1% in Indonesia, under 2% in China and Mexico, and a little over 
2% in Brazil.  General insurance agencies in India are required to source 5% of their gross 
premium within three years of operations from rural areas (2% in the first year), the actual levels 
for most companies at present are much lower.  
 
Developments in India’s financial sector, particularly after the late 1960s, resulted in substantial 
achievements in enhancing access to credit in rural areas.  Shortly after independence in 1947, the 
first survey of rural indebtedness (All India Rural Credit Survey, or AIDIS) prepared by RBI 
documented that moneylenders and other informal lenders met more than 90% of rural credit 
needs.  The share of banks in particular was only about 1% in total rural household debt.  This 
ratio remained low until 1971 when it was 2.4%, although the share of formal sources of credit in 
rural areas increased steadily to 29% due to the rising share of cooperatives.  Following bank 
nationalization, the share of banks in rural household debt increased to about 29% in 1981 and 
1991 while the share of formal or institutional sources in total debt reached 61.2% before 
declining in 1991.  Correspondingly, the share of moneylenders declined steadily over these four 
decades.  
 
Table 2: Share of rural household debt by source of credit, All India, 1951-91 (percentages) 
  Institutional     Non-Institutional    
Year Banks  Cooperatives  Government Total  Instnl.  Relative/Friends Moneylenders  Others*
1951  1.1  4.6 3.1  8.8  14.4 68.6  8.2 
1961  0.3  10.4 6.6  17.3 5.8  60.9  16 
1971 2.4  20.1  6.7  29.2  13.8  36.9  20.1 
1981  28.6  28.6 4  61.2 9  16.9  12.9 
1991  29  18.6 5.7  53.3 6.7  15.7  24.3 
*“Others” includes non-institutional sources other than friends and relatives and moneylenders, e.g., traders, 
agriculturist money lender, landlord, etc. 
Source: All India Rural Credit Survey and All India Debt and Investment Surveys (AIDIS) 
Figure 1: International Comparisons of Area 
Covered Per Branch 
Source: World Bank, Brazil, Access to Financial Services, 2003   5
 
 
While no official survey of rural access has  
been conducted since 1991, the World 
Bank-NCAER RFAS-2003 allows for 
some analysis of trends between 1991 
and 2003.
5 Relative to the findings of the 
AIDIS-1991, the incidence of 
indebtedness (i.e. proportion of 
households with debt outstanding to a 
formal finance institution) had further 
increased by 2003, indicating greater 
access and the ability to borrow.
6  Under 
the assumption that households "prefer” 
formal borrowing and were earlier 
rationed due to inadequate supply of such 
debt, the increase in formal indebtedness 
could be viewed as an improvement. (Table 3). 
 
 
According to the RFAS-2003, some 41% of rural households have a deposit account and 21% of 
rural households have access to credit from a formal source. Amongst formal institutions, 
commercial banks are by far the most dominant source of formal finance for rural households. 
They have the largest share of household deposits among rural banks, and are also the most 
important source of credit for those rural households who have access to the formal sector 
(Figures 2 and 3). 
Source: RFAS-2003. 
 
While achievements over the past decades should not be underestimated, poorer households in 
rural areas in India still have very little access to formal finance. The RFAS-2003 indicates that 
rural banks serve primarily the needs of the richer rural borrowers: some 66% of large farmers 
have a deposit account; 44% have access to credit.  Meanwhile, the rural poor face severe 
difficulties in accessing savings and credit from the formal sector: 70% of marginal/landless 
farmers do not have a bank account and  87% have no access to credit from a formal source. 
Access to formal credit is particularly a problem for meeting unforeseen expenditures – family 
                                                           
5 RFAS-2003 covers 6,000 rural households in two Indian states- Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Uttar Pradesh 
(UP).  
6 Higher incidence of debt can be interpreted in different ways; it could signify greater access and ability to 
borrow but it could also denote greater distress leading to higher demand for debt. 
Table 3: Summary comparison of AIDIS-1991 and RFAS-
2003  
All India  UP  AP 
  Formal Formal  Formal 
Percent of households indebted   
AIDIS-1991 15.6 12.5  16.5 
RFAS-2003  19.4  24.0 
Average debt per 
household 
    
AIDIS-1991 1221.0  1521.0  1691.6 
RFAS-2003   6376.0  4313.0 
Source: RBI (1989), National Sample Survey Organization 




















Figure 2: Distribution of Accounts  Figure 3: Credit outstanding by source   6
 
Note: Marginal  farming households=landholding<1 acres; Small=1 to 4 acres; 
Large farmers=>4acres; Commercial  households= with or w/o land but with 
income from non-farm sources exceeding half of total household income; 
Others=mixed households with land and non-farm commercial incomes but the 
latter being less than half of their total household income.   
sources and the local moneylender 
dominate. Over 90% of households 
report financing unusual expenses 
from cash at home, while the second 
most important source of financing 
such expenses was reportedly 
informal loans from family,  friends, 
or moneylenders. Newer sources, such 
as the recently introduced Kisan 
Credit Cards, are still statistically 
insignificant. Access to other financial 
services, such as insurance, also 
remains limited for the rural poor,   
although many would like to have access 
to insurance. Over 82% of households  
surveyed in RFAS-2003, did not have  
any insurance, and practically  none of   
the  poorest households surveyed had insurance.  
 
It should be noted, also, that large regional differences exist in the distribution of financial 
services, both in terms of the volume of transactions and branch density, with clients in India’s 
economically weaker regions having a disproportionately lower level of financial access; not 
surprisingly, poor households in the economically weaker regions are particularly starved of 
financial access. The spread of branches appears to be closely associated with regional shares in 
population: the eastern and central regions have larger shares in population and therefore, despite 
their low share in income, occupy the second and third positions in terms of share in branches. 
However, the presence of branches alone does not ensure access to finance; as expected, income 
is a key determinant to financial access. Regional differences in the volume of financial services 
(volume of credit and deposits) are largely explained by regional income differentials
7: India’s 
lesser developed and low-income eastern, central and north-eastern regions account for 54% of 
the population and 40.5% of total branches, but only 20% of outstanding credit and 29% of 
deposits (Table 4). 
 
Source: RBI, Basic Statistical Returns, 2002; RBI, Handbook of Statistics, 2003; Census 2001 
 
                                                           
7 The only outlier is the western region which has the highest volume of financial services though only the 
second highest contribution to GDP and relatively low share in total branches. This indicates a more  
developed financial institutions network in this region, which has traditionally been the hub of business and 
trading activity in India. 
Table 4. Regional differences in the distribution of financial services 
Region 




Regional per capita 
GDP/national per capita 
GDP
Share in all 
India credit
Share in all 
India deposits 
Share in all 
India bank 
branches
Northern  18% 13.8% 1.28 21.5% 22.9%  16.1%
North-Eastern  3% 3.7% 0.76 1.5% 1.6%  2.5%
Eastern  14% 23.6% 0.58 9.2% 12.9%  17.7%
Central  17% 26.6% 0.64 8.9% 13.6%  20.3%
Western  22% 15.5% 1.39 32.2% 26.4%  15.6%
Southern  28% 16.9% 1.63 26.6% 22.6%  27.4%
 Total   100% 100% 1.00 100% 100%  100%
Figure 4



















Marginal Small Large Commercial Others Total
NoCredit Account No Savings Account
Figure 4: Low access to formal finance – RFAS-2003   7
 
 
2.1.1 What explains the lack of access to formal finance by the rural poor?   
The failure of India’s rural banks to deliver finance to the poor may be attributed to a 
combination of factors affecting both banks and their clients. From the perspective of the rural 
banks,  serving the rural poor is a high-risk, high-cost proposition. First, is the problem of 
uncertainty. As in many other countries, uncertainty about the repayment capacity of poor rural 
borrowers, and their irregular/volatile income streams and expenditure patterns (Box 1), in the 
absence of credit information, serve to drive up default risk. Problems of uncertainty are 
exacerbated by the borrower’s inability to provide collateral, and/or difficulties in contract design 
and enforcement and in repossession of collateral. Also, the rural poor are perceived as “bad 
clients” because they typically want to borrow for consumption smoothening rather than 
investment purposes, and if they do borrow for investment, they lack information on how to make 
their business viable. 
 
Second, the transaction costs of rural lending in India are high, mainly due to the small loan size, 
high frequency of transactions in rural finance, large geographical spread and heterogeneity of 
borrowers, and widespread illiteracy. For private sector banks – their lack of a rural branch 
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Box 1: Income and Expenditure Patterns of the Rural Poor 
Rural households have highly irregular and volatile income streams. Irregular wage labor and the sale of 
agricultural products are the two main sources of income for rural households. The poorest rural households 
(landless and marginal farmers) are particularly dependent on irregular wage employment: About two-thirds of 
marginal farming households surveyed rely on wage labor as their primary source of income (in contrast, only 9% 
of large farming households rely on wage labor for primary income and none of these households rely on irregular 
wage labor.), while 29% rely on selling farm produce.   


























Rural households also have irregular expenditure patterns. Over one-half of the households surveyed report the 
bulk of their expenditures as being either daily or irregular.  The typical expenditure profile of rural households 
surveyed is that of small, daily or irregular expenses, incurred all through the month. Furthermore, some 99% of 
households report having incurred at least one unusual expenditure over the past six months, with the most frequent 













Source: RFAS-2003   8
 
Figure 5: Status of Rural Banks in India 
Note : RRBs (196)     DCCBs (367)  
           StCBs: (29)       
Figures in brackets represent total numbers of rural 
banks 





Third, the Indian Government’s policies make things worse from the banks’ perspective, creating 
a “financial climate” that is not conducive to lending in general, and rural banking in particular:  
 
•  High fiscal deficits have meant that Government is appropriating a large share of financial 
savings for itself. The overall public sector fiscal deficit has risen from 8.3% of GDP in 
1995-96 to around 11-12% of GDP. Not only does this preempt credit to the private sector, 
but also, it provides banks with plenty of opportunities to deploy resources in relatively 
safer assets (Government securities). Also, statutory preemptions (Statutory Liquidity Ratio  
or SLR and Cash Reserve Ratio) imposed on banks, albeit on a gradually declining path, 
remain high by international standards, further crowding out credit to the private sector. 
Banks are required to direct 40% of their lending to “priority sector” (including agriculture 
and other rural borrowers), but most banks get around this requirement by subscribing to 
other eligible instruments, for example, investing in bonds issued by apex banks such as 
NABARD and SIDBI.   
 
•  Persisting  interest rate restrictions reduce the attractiveness of lending, particularly to 
small, rural clients. Banks’ borrowing costs are kept high by “floors” on short-term deposit 
rates, while  Government policy dictates that lending rates on small loans in the rural sector  
be “capped” at the prime lending rate (PLR), which banks are free to set.  These restrictions 
impose an “implicit tax” on banks:  The loss in the income of rural banks from lower 
lending rates is estimated at US$550 million to US$1.1 billion; this implies that the net 
profit of the banking sector is 30% lower than what it could have been.   
 
•  Government’s domination of/ interference in 
rural banks, particularly the RRBs and 
cooperative banks, further distorts 
bankers’ incentives.  The inefficiencies 
arising from weak governance and poor 
management have also meant that many 
of these banks are in deep financial 
distress, and no longer in a position to 
perform their task of financial 
intermediation. (Figure 5).  
 
•  Bankers’ risk aversion to lending is 
exacerbated by a pervasive culture of 
suspicion towards bankers, whose lending 
decisions are often subject to stringent 
scrutiny by parliament, the Central Bureau 
of Investigation, etc. 
 
An outcome of these realities has been a dilution 
of the credit creating role of banks  – resulting from the distortion of risk and return signals that 
encourage banks to divert their liabilities into relatively safer and more attractive
8 Government 
                                                           
8 Indian bank managers have found that they can in fact make large profits from the trading of Government 
securities in an environment of declining interest rates (and bankers in India do not appear to have a full   9
 
securities than lending to poor rural clients who are perceived as being high risk. Outstanding 
assets of commercial banks in Government securities, at end-September, were much higher (at 
around 45%)  than the mandated SLR (25%). As capital adequacy norms are being tightened, 
further shifts are likely to take place in the deployment of deposits to Government securities and 
other investments that carry a relatively lower risk weighting than loans. 
 
From the perspective of small, rural borrowers (the users), rural banks are unattractive for the 
following reasons. First, rural banks do not provide flexible products and services to meet the 
income and expenditure patterns of small rural borrowers. As noted above, small rural borrowers 
have irregular/volatile income streams and expenditure needs, and therefore, prefer to borrow 
frequently, and repay in small installments, but most banks do not offer such products. Also, 
while small rural borrowers seek savings and lending products, they also seek insurance (life, 
health, crop), which banks do not generally offer. 
 
Second, the transaction costs of dealing with formal banks are high. In part, high transaction 
costs stem from distance to the nearest financial institutions. According to the RFAS-2003, the 
median distance to the nearest financial institution ranges from 2 kms (post office branches) to 5 
kms (commercial banks, cooperative banks); the median time taken to travel to the nearest 
commercial bank, cooperative or RRB is 30 minutes (post offices are available at closer 
proximity).  Furthermore, procedures for opening an account or seeking a loan are cumbersome 
and costly (with high rejection rates) and, as indicated by the RFAS-2003, clients have to pay 
hefty bribes (ranging from 10%-20% of the loan amount) to access loans, so that the ultimate cost 
to borrowers is very high (despite interest “caps”). On average, some 27% (and 48% in UP) of 
sample households who borrowed from an RRB report having to pay a bribe to get the loan, a 
little under 27% of households who borrowed from a commercial bank paid a bribe, and 10% of 
households who borrowed from a credit cooperative paid a bribe. The bribe amounts appear to 
vary from anywhere between 10% of the loan amount (in the case of banks) to 20% (in the case 
of cooperatives).Moreover, longer processing times for loans, together with bribes, could result in 
higher effective costs to borrowers and consequent credit rationing. It takes, on average, 33 weeks 
for a loan to be approved by a commercial bank
9  (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Aspects of formal borrowing and its costs 
  Bank  RRB  Coops  Schemes  Others 
Interest rate (median) % p.a.  12.5  11  11  14  14 
Loan amount received as % of amount applied  91.8  88.2  83.5  86.6  93.9 
Percentage households reporting bribes  26.8  27.0  9.7  27.27  23.21 
Bribe as % of amount approved  10.1  18.2  19.9  42.3  8.3 
Time taken to process a loan application (weeks)  33  28.5  24  89  14.3 
Source: RFAS-2003. 
 
A third factor that makes formal banks unattractive for rural borrowers is that banks demand 
collateral,  which poor rural borrowers lack. Indeed, the majority of loans extended by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appreciation of the interest rate risk involved in such investment allocation decisions, viewing G-Secs as 
risk-free assets). Income on sale of investments has been rising steadily over the past 5 years accounting for 
around 33% of operating profits in FY 2002-03. Simultaneously the share in total income of interest 
income on advances has fallen to levels below 40%. RBI, Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2002-03. 
9 High transaction costs of dealing with formal banks translate into a low frequency of transactions. 
According to the RFAS-2003, more than 60% of households with bank accounts report accessing their 
accounts at a frequency of less than once a month (62.3% of households with accounts in banks access their 
accounts less than once a month, while the same percentage amongst households with accounts in RRBs is 
70.8).   10
 
commercial banks, RRBs and cooperatives are collateralized, with 89% of households who 
borrowed from RRBs, and 87% of households who borrowed from commercial banks, reporting 
that they had to provide collateral (RFAS-2003). Land remains by far the most predominant form 
of collateral. But, this collateral is seldom executed, so it is just another cost, with little benefit in 
practice.  
 
2.2 Informal Finance 
 
The reliance on informal finance is heavy. Around 44% of the households surveyed by RFAS- 
2003 report having borrowed informally at least once in the preceding 12 months; the interest 
charged on informal loans averages 48% per annum. Not surprisingly, informal borrowing is very 
important for the poorest (marginal and commercial categories), who are the most deprived of 
formal finance, though it is important for virtually all household categories. (Table 6).  
Table 6. Incidence and size of informal borrowing by household category 
(% of households unless otherwise stated) 
  Marginal Small  Large  Commercial  Others Total 
Borrowed in past 12 months  48.24  39.84  35.9  39.07  42.82  44.06 
Loans currently outstanding  44.58  34.79  31.45  36.13  39.9  40.07 
Average debt/ borrower (Rs.)  9152  12523  18572  13075  17885  11136 
Average debt/ household (Rs.)  4332  4834  6373  5007  7495  4790 
Source: RFAS-2003.            
 
The main source of informal borrowing is moneylenders (some 56% of households who report 
having borrowed informally in the past 12 months used moneylenders), followed by 
friends/relatives (21%).
10  The largest uses of informal loans are for meeting “family 
emergencies”(29%) and “social expenditures” (19%) arising from events such as births, 
marriages, deaths.  Some 13% of borrowers report using informal loans for investment-related 
purposes.  
Informal loans tend to be of a short tenor. Close to 50% of the households who report having 
borrowed informally in the preceding 12 months took loans with a tenor of less than (or up to) six 
months. Other significant features that make informal loans more attractive to the poor include  
flexible repayment,  the convenience and frequency with which such loans can be accessed, and 
less reliance on collateral (only 16.5% of households report providing collateral against the loan). 
But among those who report providing collateral for informal loans, the overwhelming collateral 
cited is “self labor” – evidence of interlinked credit contracts spanning credit and labor, or bonded 
labor. Almost all cases reporting self labor as collateral are landless/marginal farmers, who are 
too poor to offer any assets as collateral, and hence most vulnerable to harsh contracts linking 
their labor to loans.  
 
                                                           
10 It is possible that households’ responses may include commission agents, traders, and other such sources 
within the ‘moneylender’ category, though other data in the RFAS-2003 suggests the likelihood of this is 
limited.   11
 
III. New Approaches to Delivering Finance to the Poor: Microfinance in India 
 
Inadequacies in rural access to formal finance and the seemingly extortionary terms of informal 
finance for the poor provide a strong need and ample space for innovative approaches to serve the 
financial needs of India’s rural poor.  Over the last decade, efforts have been made by 
government, financial institutions, and NGOs, often in partnership, to develop new financial 
delivery approaches.  These microfinance approaches have been designed to combine the safety 
and reliability of formal finance with the convenience and flexibility that are typically associated 
with informal finance.  They typically involve providing thrift, credit and other financial services 
and products of very small amounts to the poor, with the aim to raise income levels and improve 
living standards.   
 
But microfinance still plays a modest role in India. At the All-India level, less than 5% of poor 
rural households have access to microfinance (as compared to 65% in Bangladesh) but significant 
variations exist across states. The southern states in particular, account for almost 75% of funds 
flowing under microfinance programs. By far the most successful model of microfinance in India, 
in terms of scale and outreach, is SHG Bank Linkage, with other models, such as the ‘Grameen-
type’ independent microfinance institutions, lagging far behind. 
3.1 SHG Bank Linkage: Linking Banks to Grassroots Borrowers 
 
There has been growing excitement about SHG Bank Linkage, and many believe it is destined to 
become the country’s dominant system of mass-outreach banking for the poor.  The SHG model 
was started in the 1980s by social-development NGOs
11, many of whom took up group-formation 
(especially of women) as their main tool.  Having group members learn how to pool savings into 
loans – mostly small, short-term consumption loans  – was seen as empowering disadvantaged 
women, socially and politically as well as financially. By 1992 the NGOs had, heroically, 
persuaded government to take the idea seriously. Legal obstacles were removed and subsidies 
made available so that SHGs could take bulk loans from banks that could be on-lent to group 
members who could use them to take up or expand microbusinesses.  
 
The model evolved so that SHG Bank Linkage today involves having the group save, and then 
linking it to a bank (usually the rural branch of a state-owned commercial bank, but also RRBs, 
cooperative banks, etc  Funds saved by SHGs are placed in a group deposit account in the bank. 
The group then borrows from the bank (at about 12% per annum), using its saving and group 
guarantee as the collateral.  To encourage banks to lend to SHGs, NABARD has provided 
subsidized refinancing support to banks, although the demand for such refinancing has declined 
as banks begin to discover that SHG lending is quite profitable, and characterized by default rates 
(less than 1%) that are, in fact, much lower than the rate of default on their regular lending 
portfolios (11%-12%). 
 
Banks typically provide the group a loan amounting to four times the group’s savings but, as the 
group matures, and based on the group’s track record, banks are ready to lend more. Borrowed 
and saved funds are rotated through lending within the group using flexible repayment schedules 
(usually monthly repayment); SHGs thus save, borrow and repay collectively.  SHG funds may 
be distributed either to one or more members of the group – who are personally responsible for 
repayment to the group, or spent collectively by the group. The group is free to decide the interest 
                                                           
11 The two main NGOs to start this process were MYRADA in Karnataka and PRADAN in Rajasthan (and 
later in Tamil Nadu and Jharkhand)   12
 
rate charged to its members, but typically, a member borrows from the group at about 24% per 
annum.  After a loan from a bank is fully repaid, the group may borrow again, often a larger 
amount.  
 
3.1.1 The Phenomenal Growth of SHG Bank Linkage: From a small experiment to a 
‘movement’ 
Growth in the numbers of SHGs formed, and the scale of their interaction with banks, has been 
very fast in the last three or four years, and is still accelerating. What started as a pilot has now 
become a ‘movement’. The number of SHGs linked to banks has increased from just 500 in the 
early 1990s, to over 800,000 by 2004. NABARD hopes to see a million SHGs serving 20 million 
households by 2008.  The rapid rate at which the model has scaled-up, particularly since the late 
1990s, is truly remarkable.  Between 1999 and 2003, the number of SHGs linked to banks 
increased cumulatively from 32,995 to 717,306.  This is an increase of more than 2000%, a 
staggering achievement in a short period of four years.  During the same period, the amount of 
loans disbursed cumulatively increased by 3,487%.  But with an outreach of about 12 million 
women and their households (in a country where 460 million people live on less than $/day), 
SHG Bank Linkage has a long way to go before it can really make a dent (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 : Growth in volumes of SHG-bank linkage 
By Mar 31  Number of SHGs linked to banks, 
cumulative nos. 
Cumulative bank loans (Rs. 
million) 
1999 32,995  571 
2000 114,775  1,930 
2001 263,825  4,809 
2002 461,478  10,263 
2003 717,306  20,487 
  Source: World Bank (2003). 
 
3.2 ‘Grameen Replicator- type’ Microfinance Institutions  
 
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of other institutional structures for microfinance, 
notably, independent, specialized microfinance institutions (MFIs) that are based on the Grameen 
model pioneered by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh. But with a few exceptions, most Indian 
MFIs are small in size, region specific (with a  concentration in the south)
12 and the sector has a 
limited collective outreach.  The Small Industries Development Bank of India has been the largest 
lender to the MFIs, though Friends of Women’s World Banking India as well as the National 
Women’s Fund (Rashtriya Mahila Kosh) have also played an important role. 
 
In March 2003, the Indian MFIs sector as a whole had a total outreach of less than one million 
borrowers.  In comparison, larger MFIs in Bangladesh, such as Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika 
and ASA, reach well over one million clients, each.  In March 2003, the Indian MFIs sector as a 
whole had loans outstanding of Rs2.4 billion (US$53 million), with the two largest MFIs, 
SHARE Microfin Ltd and BASIX, having loans outstanding of about Rs500 million (US$11 
million) and Rs350 million (US$8 million), respectively.  One estimate indicates that the average 
loans disbursed by the top 10 MFIs in India amounted to just Rs160 million (US$3.5 million) per 
MFI. Another estimate, based on 69 rated MFIs  (which are among India’s top 100 MFIs), shows 
that these MFIs had about 6,500 borrowers and Rs23 million (a little over US$500,000) 
outstanding, per MFI. (Sinha, 2003).  These numbers are modest in comparison to lending by 
                                                           
12 Among the top 10 MFIs in the country, all but CASHPOR in eastern UP are located in the southern 
states.   13
 
MFIs in Bangladesh: Grameen Bank’s loan portfolio alone exceeds that of the entire 
microfinance sector in India by a factor of five whereas BRAC’s portfolio is more than three 
times that of all MFIs in India; both ASA’s and Proshika’s portfolios are also larger than that of 
the entire microfinance sector in India.   
In addition to the relatively small scale of their operations, Indian MFIs also tend to have a 
narrow scope, offering a limited range of financial services beyond credit.  Only a handful of 
MFIs, such as VSSU (West Bengal) offer savings as a service.  Insurance is also provided by only 
a few MFIs.  And only the three top MFIs in India offer a composite set of services to their 
customers.  For example, SEWA Ahmedabad provides a combination of savings and credit 
through its Sri Mahila SEWA Urban Cooperative Bank and insurance services managed through 
its Vimo SEWA affiliate, which front ends for the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and a 
number of general insurance companies. Similarly, the BASIX group’s Krishna Bhima 
Samruddhi Local Area Bank, is able to provide all the services – savings, including daily deposits 
collected from the doorstep of its borrowers, credit for a range of purposes from crop loans to 
non-farm activities and to SHGs; and crop insurance to farmers under the Kisan Credit Card / 
Rashtriya Krishi Bima Yojana as well as a weather indexed crop product developed by ICICI 
Lombard.  BASIX retails life insurance on behalf of AVIVA Life Insurance Company and 
provides livestock insurance to its borrowers through Royal Sundaram General Insurance 
Company. 
SHARE, one of the three largest MFIs in India, has recently piloted, in partnership with ICICI 
Bank, a private sector bank, an innovative approach involving the securitization of the micro loan 
portfolios of MFIs.  Two such deals have recently been completed in the state of AP. In the larger 
one, ICICI Bank paid US$4.3 million for a portfolio of 42,500 small loans from SHARE. SHARE 
will be responsible for collecting the loans. The securitization is not asset-backed; ICICI Bank 
will have as collateral instead a “first loss” guarantee of an 8% deposit from the total from 
Grameen Foundation. The approach has many advantages: ICICI Bank manages to reach 
borrowers it could never otherwise have approached, and palm off most of the administration to 
SHARE. This also helps it meet its government-set target of directing 40% of its loans to the 
“priority sectors”, including 18% to farmers. SHARE secures a new source of funds, off 
SHARE’s balance sheet, at a cost that is 3 to 4 percentage points cheaper than it pays for a bank 
loan. This will help SHARE meet its aim of increasing the number of borrowers from under 
300,000 now to 1 million. The deal also helps create a new asset class for which there is demand 
among the more liquid investors.  While such securitizations can be done for the better MFIs, for 
which credit ratings are available, replication would pose a serious challenge, given the paucity of 
reliable, independent information on the bulk of the MFIs and their loan portfolios. Also, at 
present, there is no secondary market for the securities, but ICICI bank is talking to CRISIL, a 
credit rating agency, about the prospects for its rating the paper, and is hoping that over time, 
other banks will enter the market too. 
 
The limited scale and scope of Indian MFIs, relative to the MFI giants in Indonesia and 
Bangladesh, reflects the following interrelated factors:  
 
•  First, MFIs  suffer from the lack of a sufficient pool of managerial and technical skills. As 
microfinance is a specialized activity and given that many MFIs have evolved from NGOs 
that have otherwise been focusing on grant based activities, staff tend to have a stronger 
inclination towards social development issues and tend to possess limited skills in finance, 
accounting and business management. Expertise in internal controls, credit appraisal and risk 
management, MIS, financial control and management, financial analysis, business planning, 
systems development, new product design, etc. tends to be lacking.      14
 
 
•  Second, and partly as a result of their managerial and technical weaknesses, Indian MFIs 
today find it difficult to mobilize commercial funding. Most MFIs face a serious shortage of 
equity necessary to leverage debt and increase client outreach at a faster rate. Sa-Dhan, the 
leading network of MFIs in the country, projects a requirement of equity funds of Rs100 
crores (US$22 million), that can be absorbed immediately by MFIs. ICICI Bank, that has 
partnership arrangements with 30 MFIs at present, with plans to increase this to around 50 
MFIs in a year’s time, also projects the lack of equity for the second rung of MFIs (40-45 out 
of the 50 they plan to target) as being a constraint/requirement to scaled up debt financing by 
them. Also, banks like IDBI Bank indicate that while they are willing and interested in 
increasing the debt exposure to MFIs, lack of equity capital (and management capacity) 
amongst MFIs constrains them from doing so. Since 2000
13, debt financing from banks to 
MFIs has grown rapidly relative to earlier years – available data from four private sector 
banks shows that the banks’ exposure to MFIs is today in excess of Rs200 crores (US$44 
million); this compares to SIDBI’s exposure of Rs120 crores, US$26 million)
 14. However, 
this growth has been targeted at a relatively small set of 10-15 better MFIs and commercial 
banks are still risk averse when it comes to lending to a larger set of MFIs, pointing out that 
considerable potential to scale up commercial bank lending to MFIs exists. At present, the 
exposure of commercial banks to lending to MFIs constitutes a miniscule fraction (0.1%) of 
the balance sheets of these banks.  
 
The cost of funds for Indian MFIs is relatively high, and unlike in Bangladesh and a number 
of other countries, the Indian MFI sector has not benefited from grants/subsidized funding. 
Unlike in, say, Bangladesh, where Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) lends to MFIs 
at 4-6 per cent p.a. (less than half the market interest rate), Indian MFIs, right from 
inception, tend to raise debt (from SIDBI, FWWB or commercial banks) at market rates 
(between 11-13.5 per cent p.a.). While, in many ways, this is a more sustainable way to 
grow, in practice, the high cost of funds combined with problems in accessing equity, has 
meant that achieving profitability and growth has been more difficult for Indian MFIs than 
their counterparts in countries like Bangladesh. 
 
•  Third, the absence of an enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework is often cited by 
MFI representatives as a factor constraining their ability to access funds, and hence, scale-up. 
MFIs can mobilize deposits only if they convert themselves into an NBFC and receive an  
‘investment grade’ rating from a corporate rating agency. This is difficult for most MFI-
NBFCs; based on past examples, on account of the typically geographically concentrated and 
non-collateralized portfolios that MFIs have, rating agencies, in almost all cases, have not 
assigned the required credit rating. The minimum start-up capital requirement for registering 
as an NBFC (Rs20 million or US$450,000) is typically beyond the reach of most MFIs.
15  
                                                           
13 The year 2000 corresponds to RBI allowing commercial banks lending to MFIs as constituting priority 
sector lending and also to the maturing and scaling up of some of the better MFIs in India. 
14 In recent years, debt financing to MFIs from commercial banks, has increased significantly. These banks 
include Canara Bank, ICICI Bank, UTI Bank, Andhra Bank, HDFC Bank, ABN Amro Bank, IDBI Bank, 
amongst others. ICICI Bank, through a partnership model, has witnessed a growth of Rs100 crores in their 
debt portfolio to MFIs over the last year, taking the total portfolio to Rs120 crores, the same portfolio as 
SIDBI. IDBI Bank, HDFC Bank and UTI Bank also have an exposure together of over Rs80 crores to 
MFIs.  
15 In Indonesia, for instance, the comparable minimum capital requirement ranges from US$58,000-
232,000. In the Philippines, the start-up minimum capital requirement for rural banks is between 
US$68,000-170,000; this has prompted the conversion of many erstwhile microfinance institutions/NGOs 
into rural banks.     15
 
Similarly, the minimum capital requirements for insurance companies (Rs1 billion, or US$23 
million) are high.  MFIs have problems raising equity, too: NGOs are not allowed to invest in 
MFI equity, because of the charitable status of NGOs under Sections 11 and 12 of the Income 
Tax Act. Regulation on foreign direct investment (FDI) in MFIs dictates rather high 
minimum levels; foreign equity must be a minimum of US$500,000 for FDI upto 51%, US$5 
million for FDI between 51-75%, and US$50 million for FDI 75-100%.  Since 2002, MFIs 
are no longer allowed to raise debt from foreign donors and development finance institutions 
through the ‘External Commercial Borrowing’ (ECB) route. Furthermore, oversight is 
fragmented across many government agencies resulting in inefficiencies; a large number of 
government ministries/departments/agencies are responsible for MFIs, and coordination 
between them is poor.
16 
 
                                                           
16 Issues affecting MFIs are handled by various government departments, including various departments of 
RBI (such as the Department of Non-Banking Supervision, which looks after NBFCs, and the Exchange 
Control Department).    16
 
IV. Evaluating SHG Bank Linkage 
 
4.1 How Effective Has SHG Bank Linkage Been in Targeting the Poor?  
 
Although data available to us cannot answer this question directly, we can look at some indirect 
indicators on the relationship between SHGs and the poor using results of the RFAS-2003 for the 
states of AP and UP.
 17   
First, the majority of the beneficiaries of SHG Bank Linkage are from among the poorer groups.  
RFAS-2003 indicates that nearly 54% of SHG members are from the poorest groups—the 
landless and marginal farmers.  However, significant differences exist across states.  While 73% 
of SHG members in UP are from the poorest households – the landless and marginal farmers, the 
corresponding proportion in AP is lower (43%).  In AP, though, almost a quarter of the poorest 
households belong to SHGs, but the proportion of households from richer categories that belong 
to SHGs is much higher (Table 8). 
Table 8.  SHG membership by type of households 
  Marginal  Small  Medium  Large  Others  Total 
Andhra Pradesh             
SHG member (% households)   25.3  34.3  31.1  29  29.6  28.2 
% of SHG members  43.3  14  11.4  11.4  19.9  100 
Uttar Pradesh             
SHG member (% households)   10.3  5.4  5.3  4.1  6.7  8.2 
% of SHG members  72.8  8.8  7.4  4.4  6.7  100 
Marginal = landholding less than 1 acre, Small = 1-2 acres, Medium = 2-4 acres, Large = more than 4 acres.  Others 
includes households with or without land but involved in commercial activities. 
Source: RFAS-2003 
 
We can explore further the success with which SHGs are targeting the poorest by examining the 
attributes of households that are SHG members, using data from AP.  We model this in a ‘probit’ 
framework using as explanatory variables household’s relative income rank in terms of income 
quintiles (“poorest” are the bottom quintile, qint2 the next and so on) and the number of SHGs 
available in the village (shgnum).  Other explanatory variables available in the survey include the 
number of other households in the village that are related to the household (relatvs), since this 
could indicate the household’s access to informal finance.
18  We also include as explanatory 
variable whether or not it has an account with a formal financial institution (bankac), as a crude 
indicator for access to the household of formal finance.  Finally, we also include a regional 
dummy for villages in coastal districts (coastal). 
 
                                                           
17 The RFAS targeted roughly 60 villages in each state, though the actual number of villages sampled was 
higher in UP.  Data from RFAS, which was a household survey, include responses from those who were 
members of SHGs, as well as village-level data.  Based on the latter, a total of 736 SHGs were in operation 
in the villages covered by RFAS, with the overwhelming majority in AP as would be expected. Not only 
does AP have the preponderance of SHGs, these groups are overwhelmingly comprised of women only. 
Women’s groups accounted for 95% of all SHGs in the state.  By contrast, in UP, groups comprising only 
men and mixed groups were also well represented. 
18 Friends and family are a major source of informal borrowings.   17
 
The estimated coefficients are reported in terms of the 
incremental impact on the probability of the household 
being an SHG member due to a small change in the 
explanatory variable.  Thus, an increase in the number 
of SHGs in the village by 1 increases the probability of 
a household being in an SHG by 0.2%.  Similarly, 
households in the second quintile have a 7.8% higher 
likelihood of being in SHGs compared to households in 
the richest quintile.  Although the overall fit of the 
regression is low, suggesting other variables (not 
available in the survey data) are also important, the 
coefficients of all  variables included are statistically 
significant   at   5%  level  of  significance,   except  the  
poorest and quint4.  The three variables with statistically insignificant coefficients are poorest, 
quint4 and expnd.  This suggests that households in the two quintiles above the poorest 
households are more likely to be SHG members, while the poorest and those in the top two 
income quintiles are less likely to be in SHGs.  Note though that the coefficient for poorest 
quintile is positive even if insignificant, and that the second quintile may still include households 
that are quite poor, even if not among the poorest (Table 9). 
 
We can also use the RFAS-2003 data to answer a related question using villages and SHGs in AP, 
where SHGs were found in all villages: Are poorer villages more likely to have a larger number 
of SHGs?  What explains inter-village variations in SHGs?  One approach is to use the standard 
Poisson model for count data to analyze the number of SHGs in a given village.  Specifically, let 
yi denote the number of SHGs in village i and let yi be distributed as a Poisson with mean μi 
where 
 
μi = exp (Xi β)  
 
and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables.  However, a preliminary look at the data shows an 
overdispersion in number of SHGs relative to the Poisson, with the variance substantially higher 
than the mean.  To account for the overdispersion, we use a negative binomial distribution that 
can be viewed as modifying the equation above to  
 
μi = exp (Xi β + u i)  
 
 where u i denotes some omitted variable(s) such that e
u
i  follows a Gamma distribution with mean 
1 and variance α.  Larger values of α imply greater dispersion in the data. 
 
Table 9.  Probit estimates of likelihood of a 
household being a member of an SHG 
  dF/dx  s.e.  Z 
Shgnum     0.002  0.001  2.27 
Coastal  -0.045  0.017  -2.58 
Poorest   0.039  0.030  1.32 
Quint2     0.072  0.028  2.67 
Quint3  0.102  0.034  3.13 
Quint4  0.039  0.028  1.41 
Bankac    -0.042  0.019  -2.23 
relatvs   -0.007  0.002  -3.46 
N=  2910  PseudoR2=  0.011
Source:RFAS-2003   18
 
Results of the negative binomial regression 
are provided below using a number of 
explanatory variables related to poverty in 
the village – village average per capita 
income (avpcy), inequality in land holdings 
(giniland), and connectivity of the village 
measured by distance to nearest railway 
station and nearest metal road (rail & road 
respectively).  Poorer villages will have 
lower per capita incomes, while greater 
inequality for any given per capita income 
would indicate more poor people in the 
village.  Villages farther away from access 
to rail and road, and hence markets, may be 
relatively poorer.  The percentage of 
illiterate  households  in  the  village  is  also  
likely to be  correlated  with  village poverty        
and is included.  In addition, we also include 
an index of educational attainment for  
villagers who are not illiterate in the form of percentage having primary education.  Other 
variables included are total village size in terms of number of households (size) and whether or 
not NGOs are active in the village (NGO).  Finally, since rural institutions like RRBs and 
cooperatives can also assist with SHG formation, we also included their distance from the village 
(RRB and coop respectively) (Table 10). 
 
The results suggest absence of a strong relationship between village-level indicators of poverty 
and the number of SHGs.  The size of the village is significant indicating the larger the village, 
greater the number of SHGs found. Higher rates of illiteracy, presumed correlated to poorer 
villages, are associated with fewer SHGs in the village.
19  Similarly, the negative sign for 
(distance to) metal road implies villages in the interior, away from good roads, have fewer SHGs. 
Noticeably, neither village per capita income nor inequality within the village is significant, again 
underlining the weak link between poverty and presence of SHGs.   The coefficient for NGOs is 
negative but insignificant, implying no significant relationship between presence of NGOs and 
number of SHGs in the village.   
 
To summarize, therefore, the RFAS-2003 data allow for the first time a statistical analysis of 
certain aspects of SHGs in India, which we have used to look at the reach of the SHG-bank 
linkage model into the poorest households, who are predominantly amongst those excluded from 
formal finance.  Our results show a positive relationship between poorer households (income 
quintiles from 20-40 and 40-60) and SHG membership.  The relationship between the poorest 
households and SHG membership is positive too, though not significant statistically.  On the 
other hand, despite the proliferation of SHGs across the state in AP, the data suggests that the 
poorer and more difficult to reach villages are likely to have relatively fewer SHGs.  This only 
further underlines the challenges ahead in scaling-up microfinance for a vast and varied country 
like India. 
                                                           
19  However, this would also be consistent with the notion that greater illiteracy makes more difficult the 
formation of SHGs.   
Table 10.  Negative Binomial Regression Estimates for 
SHGs in a village, AP 
  Coef.  z  P>z 
Constant  5.96  3.98  0 
Size  0.002  6.15  0 
Illiterate  -0.04  -2.25  0.024 
Primary  -0.07  -3.88  0 
Avpcy  0.00  0.07  0.943 
Giniland  -1.47  -0.94  0.348 
Ngo  -0.33  -1.60  0.11 
Rail  0.01  1.43  0.154 
Road  -0.06  -1.95  0.052 
RRB  -0.03  -2.01  0.045 
Coop  0.02  2.29  0.022 
Alpha  0.22  0.06  3.49 
N  59  Pseudo R
2  0.12 
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0:  chi
2(1) =    50.19   Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000.  Robust estimates used for standard errors. 
Source:RFAS-2003   19
 
 
4.2 Impact on Vulnerability of Poor Households 
 
Recent analyses indicate that access to loans under SHG Bank Linkage has contributed to the 
reduction in vulnerability of poor households.
20 This reduction in vulnerability takes the form of: 
(1)  Improvement in asset position: the program significantly improved the asset position 
(comprising livestock and consumer durables) of sample households. The average increase in 
assets was about 72%, from Rs6,843 to Rs11,793 in real terms (in one to three years). About 59% 
of households saw assets increase after groups were formed. Before the groups were formed, one 
in three households had no assets; after the groups were formed that changed to one in six; (2) 
Increase in savings: the average savings per member more than tripled, from Rs460 before the 
group to Rs1,444 after; (3) Changes in borrowing patterns and activities financed: average 
borrowing per household increased from Rs4,282 to Rs8,341. A shift was observed in the 
activities of the self-help groups, with a lower share of consumption and cultivation loans after 
the groups formed and a larger share of allied agricultural activities and small businesses; (4) 
Increase in employment: employment per household went from an average of 318 days a year to 
375 days. The proportion of employment generated through nonfarm and off-farm activities 
increased; (5) Increase in consumption expenditure: consumption expenditure per household per 
month increased from Rs799 to Rs993. Per capita consumption increased from Rs197 per month 
to Rs249; (6) Impact on income: the average net income per household increased from Rs 20,177 
to Rs26,889. About 43% of the incremental income generated was from nonfarm activities; (7) 
Impact on poverty: about 234 households were below the poverty line before groups were 
formed, compared with 122 after; (8) Social impact: 89% of members reported that, as a result of 
the group’s activities, they could meet officials from the government or from banks, while about 
77% had never had that opportunity before. Changes were also reported regarding attitudes 
toward women. 
 
Further work should be conducted on the performance of the program from the point of view of 
the financial institutions that provide the linkage. This would provide lessons on the costs and 
benefits associated with the self-help group model, including which entity in the linkage covers 
what costs, what financial benefits banks get from the self-help group program, potential 
adjustments and innovations banks have made to the self-help group model, and incentives that 
motivate them to be involved in the program and in microfinance in general. It will be 
particularly important to analyze private banks to draw on their experiences and assess their 
potential to play a larger role in microfinance in India. 
4.3 Some Lessons from SHG Bank Linkage 
 
In large part, the success of SHG Bank Linkage may be attributable to the fact that it is well 
aligned with Indian history and circumstances, and capitalizes on the country’s vast network of 
rural bank branches.  The idea of local savings-and-loan clubs enjoying access to formal financial 
services by becoming corporate customers of banks is a good one and is practiced in a small way 
in many countries. A well-run club can keep its reserves at the bank and take bulk loans which it 
can on-lend to its members at a premium, covering its costs and rewarding its savers in the 
process.  In India, this practice seems particularly appropriate on two counts: First, the country 
has active NGOs that have been zealous in their efforts towards group formation; NGOs view 
SHGs as having many benefits (such as women’s empowerment) beyond microfinance.  Second, 
and perhaps even more important, SHG Bank Linkage seems particularly suited to India because 
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the model capitalizes on the country’s vast (and unique) network of rural banks that are otherwise 
unable to reach out to the poor. 
 
Equally important, the success of SHG Bank Linkage underscores just how important a role 
skillful leadership, good policy, and a conducive legal and regulatory framework can play.   
Indeed, the role of government in establishing the necessary policy and legal framework, and the 
leadership role assumed by NABARD in championing the movement, cannot be underestimated.  
Government recognized the potential of SHG banking very early on in the movement’s history; 
NABARD was given the task of leading this effort and it took to task with exemplary diligence.  
It involved NGOs, commercial banks, RRBs and even cooperative banks in forming SHGs and 
then linking those up with nearby bank branches.  Legal obstacles were removed and the RBI 
issued Guidelines in 1992, to experiment with a pilot of 500 SHGs to link with banks. This pilot 
program as well as the work of a number of NGOs was reviewed by a Working Group on Bank 
Lending to the Poor through NGOs and SHGs (1995) and detailed guidelines were drawn to 
encourage banks to use this method.   
 
To encourage banks to lend to SHGs, NABARD made available subsidized refinancing to banks 
for their lending to SHGs, so that the groups could take bulk loans from banks that could be on-
lent to group members who could use them to take up or expand microbusinesses.
 (More recently, 
such subsidized refinancing to banks has been phased out, as banks have begun to see SHG 
lending as a profitable and commercially viable business).  Further inducements for banks came 
in the form of allowing banks to count SHG lending towards their legal obligation to direct a 
fraction of their loans to the poor (‘priority sector lending’ obligations). It seemed an ideal way to 
realize an old Indian dream – to make the vast network of rural banks key suppliers of loans to 
the poor. 
 
4.4 Key Concerns, Going Forward  
 
4.4.1 Outreach  
The outreach of SHG Bank Linkage, however, remains limited, reaching only about 12 million 
women and their households (in a country where 460 million people live on less than $/day). The 
outstandings of the SHG program in March 2003 were around Rs10 billion (US$217 million), 
thus catering to 2.2% to 6.6% of the estimated demand. (Mahajan and Ramola, 2003). And loan 
amounts remain small.  In 2003, SHG member households got an average of Rs1,766 as credit, 
after being in a group and meeting monthly for anywhere between 9 to 24 months. In 2002-03 
only 22% of SHGs existing at the beginning of the year, received loans during the course of the 
year – even assuming a two year loan period, this means that more than half of the existing SHGs 
did not receive a loan during the year.  In addition, the program remains concentrated in the 
southern states of India: the Southern region accounts for 65% of the SHGs linked and over 75% 
of the amount disbursed.  In contrast, the North- eastern region accounts for 0.6% of the SHGs 
and 0.3% of the amount.  Even the densely populated and highly poor Eastern region accounts for 





Even its most enthusiastic supporters have voiced concerns about the sustainability of SHG Bank 
Linkage.  An important concern relates to the lack of clarity over who is to play the key role of 
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promoting and maintaining groups to ensure quality, and how the costs of doing so are to be 
met.
22  In the early phase of the SHG movement, the tasks of promoting, nurturing and 
strengthening groups
23, were performed by grass roots NGOs. However, in NABARD’s zeal to 
link a cumulative total of one million SHGs to banks by 2008, and as SHG Bank Linkage has 
caught the attention of politicians who view the program as an easy vote winner, quantitative 
targets on the number of groups to be promoted each year are overriding concerns about the 
quality of the groups promoted. Many of the recent groups have been promoted by institutions 
that either lack the required skills and local knowledge or ones that are driven by short term 
monetary incentives. Many groups have come together on an ad hoc basis, only because they 
want a loan. Inadequate attention to group quality could threaten the longer term credibility and 
viability of the entire program.  Indeed, recent evidence suggests that the quality of groups is 
already beginning to suffer.  A recent APMAS Survey in 2002 indicated that only 17% of all 
groups were of adequate quality for bank linkage and this was in a state which is considered the 
leader in the movement. 
 
Concerns have also been expressed about the financial sustainability of SHG Bank Linkage.  The 
state-owned commercial banks and RRBs, which are the main players in SHG banking, have been 
increasing their lending to SHGs dramatically, but this has been done without much attention to 
the actual costs of doing business with SHGs.  Banks have been lending to SHGs at interest rates 
of between 12% and 12.5%. Recently, two state-owned banks, the State Bank of India and 
Andhra Bank, have announced their intention to lend at 9% per annum, viewing SHG lending as a 
highly profitable business. Recent studies, however, indicate that the all inclusive costs of lending 
to SHGs are in fact much higher than what state-owned banks seem to think, and could range 
anywhere between 15% (which is what private banks like ICICI Bank charge when they lend to 
SHGs) to 28%. In a study of five RRB branches, Sinha (2003) shows that the all inclusive costs 
of lending to SHGs (taking into account the relatively high transaction costs of dealing with 
SHGs as well the costs of group formation, which banks are increasingly beginning to bear) 
would translate into interest rates of anywhere between 22% and 28% per year,  and in one case, 
where the RRB was located in a low density, forested district, the costs translated into interest 
rates as high as 48% per annum.  The SHG portfolio is a small part of the total bank lending, 
portfolio quality is good, and it may be possible to cross subsidize this, but unless banks charge 
interest rates to recover costs, the model’s financial viability and longer term sustainability may 
be jeopardized. 
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ups, marketing, and re-investment), ensuring  the groups remain financially sustainable and have the ability 
to weather personal losses (accidents, sickness, death), and natural disasters, etc.   22
 
 
V. Meeting the Challenge of Scaling-Up Access to Finance for India’s Rural Poor 
 
5.1 Scaling-Up Microfinance 
 
With significant achievements in recent years, SHG-Bank Linkage needs to be actively supported 
since, among alternatives in the microfinance sector, this is where there appears to be maximum 
potential for scaling-up, while leveraging on India’s vast network of rural banks. At the same 
time, in an economy as large and varied as India’s, there is much scope for diversity and new 
approaches.  Government has an important role to play in creating space for innovation and a 
flexible architecture for new, independent microfinance institutions.  What are the critical issues 
in scaling-up SHG Bank Linkage and various other models of microfinance in India?  This 
section draws on lessons learned, on what to do and what not do to, based on the experience with 
SHG Bank Linkage and other microfinance approaches in India, and experience from around the 
world.  
 
5.1.1 Enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework  
An enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework is critical to scaling-up. Such a framework is 
already in place for SHG Bank Linkage, and scaling-up the model would require the government 
to simply ensure that the existing framework is maintained. This would require ensuring that the 
model continues to have a champion with a clear leadership role  – a task which NABARD has 
assumed with exemplary diligence by introducing policies and measures to encourage banks to 
lend to SHGs. And it would require the authorities to maintain a ‘hands-off’ regulatory policy.  
Government could play an important role in establishing an enabling policy, legal and regulatory 
framework for MFIs.  While the success of individual MFIs is largely attributable to their 
visionary leaders, this is clearly not enough to mainstream the cause of MFIs.  Advocates of MFIs 
argue that immediate measures needed include the following: (i) reducing minimum start-up 
capital requirements to facilitate the transformation of MFIs into NBFCs; (ii) encouraging 
multiple sources of equity for MFIs; (iii) facilitating MFIs to raise debt, including permitting 
MFIs to mobilize savings, with safeguards; (iv) developing a set of prudential norms that are 
more appropriate to institutions serving the poor, and set up supervision mechanisms around 
those norms. They argue that better policy coordination among the various government 
ministries/departments/agencies that cover MFI issues would also help greatly.   
 
Understandably, the Indian authorities appear reluctant to introduce tiered regulations for MFIs, 
as this would mean the regulation and supervision of a new class of financial institutions whose 
deposits would probably be guaranteed (at least implicitly) by government.  An alternative to 
introducing tiered regulations could be for government to facilitate transitional funding (equity 
and debt) support to MFIs that would enable these institutions to graduate into formal institutions 
such as NBFCs or banks.  One suggestion that has been floated recently in this context is for 
government to establish, in partnership with public and private financial institutions, and possibly 
donors, a microfinance equity and credit guarantee fund that would facilitate the outreach and 
sustainability of micro finance through the following instruments: (i) equity/quasi equity support 
to a set of competitively selected MFIs to facilitate their transformation into microfinance focused 
banks or NBFCs that operate as regulated financial entities; (ii) credit guarantees to commercial 
banks for lending to MFIs, so as to facilitate access by MFIs to commercial bank funding; (iii) 
credit enhancement product designed to enable MFIs to access capital markets, specifically bond 
markets.   23
 
  
5.1.2 Attention to quality, and the importance of financial sustainability  
Scaling-up SHG Bank Linkage requires attention to the quality and sustainability of groups, their 
promoters and lenders (banks). A strong focus on the quality of SHGs by their NGO promoters 
was a key factor in the success of this model in its pilot phase.  But in recent years, growing 
concerns have emerged about group quality as well as the ability of partner banks to properly 
assess, monitor and manage risk on their SHG portfolios.  Going forward, if SHG Bank Linkage 
is to be scaled-up, NABARD and its partners face several challenges,
24 key among which include 
ensuring that high quality groups are created and maintained, and that concerns over numeric 
targets of group creation and linkage do not override attention to group quality and resilience. In 
particular, the success and sustainability of SHG Bank Linkage depends crucially upon greater 
clarity about who is to play the key role of maintaining quality, and how the costs of doing so are 
to be met.  A clear strategy is required on how new groups will be promoted, and who will fund 
this.  If NGOs remain involved as promoters and ‘minders’ of the groups, they will need to be 
paid to do so, yet in the long run, with their social-development perspective, NGOs are not ideal 
candidates for this role, and nor is it clear who are to be their long-term paymasters. But the banks 
themselves, whose business is financial services, are unlikely to want to do more than ensure that 
their loans are safe, and will not take on the time-consuming task of helping groups manage the 
bookkeeping of their internal savings and loan accounts. Left to themselves, without outside 
assistance, most groups will have great difficulty maintaining quality, and the poorer they are the 
truer this will be. 
25 Equally, efforts need to focus on ensuring that banks price their loans to 
SHGs at rates that would cover their costs and ensure financial sustainability of SHG banking. 
Banks also need to focus more on monitoring and managing SHG lending risk.  
 
Similarly, attention is needed to ensure the quality of MFIs. Many Indian MFIs suffer from weak 
governance and management structures, and the absence of adequate internal controls and 
financial discipline – issues that must be addressed. 
5.1.3 Clear targeting of clients 
Equally important is the need to ensure proper targeting of clients. The dual pursuit of social ends 
and financial profits is an ongoing tension for all in microfinance.  While our analysis of SHG 
Bank Linkage indicates that the model has so far successfully targeted the poorer segments, 
mission drift is a common fear as pressures mount to serve richer clients with larger loans (and 
thereby to earn higher profits per loan since transaction costs per rupee tend to fall with loan 
size).  Keeping focused on its target population is thus critical to the success of microfinance in 
India, as elsewhere.  
 
The experiences of Bangladesh, Indonesia and elsewhere offer some useful pointers for India. 
There has been much debate about how stringently to target, and how best to do it in practice.  A 
first priority is to clearly determine who is being targeted and define eligibility rules.  In 
Bangladesh, Grameen and BRAC employ eligibility rules to restrict attention to households 
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corrosive effects of poor management, confused accounting, capture of assets by the leadership, and other 
kinds of abuse.   24
 
holding under a half acre of land.  Grameen expands the definition to also exclude households 
with more than the equivalent of an acre’s worth of assets.  BRAC excludes households without a 
manual laborer.  Others, like SafeSave, rely on geographic targeting, restricting attention to 
specific slums in Dhaka.  Microfinance in Bangladesh has earned a reputation for maintaining a 
focus on women from functionally landless households (although this has softened in practice).  
In Indonesia, BRI has also focused on serving the under-served, but, in contrast, it has focused on 
low-income households (and not just those below the poverty line) and most clients are men.  
 
The eligibility rules, though, tend to be less stringent than they would seem at first.  In practice, 
both Grameen and BRAC staff make exceptions to the half-acre rule, and some estimates suggest 
that as many as 30% of borrowers may be over the half-acre line.  The deviations may reflect that 
land is low-quality or that households are large so that per capita holdings are relatively low.  At 
other times, the rules may be stretched simply to give access to community members who will be 
promising program members.   
 
5.1.4 Appropriate products and services and good staffing are critical to ensuring effectiveness 
The stretching of rules is kept in check by other practices which have a strong bearing on who is 
attracted to microfinance and who is turned away.  Those practices include how products are 
designed, how staff are compensated, what messages are delivered from headquarters, and who is 
recruited onto staff.   
 
Group promoters from local communities are generally better able to target poorer households. 
Product design is another means of targeting.  Lending in groups and sending staff to villages has 
been credited with much of microfinance’s appeal in Bangladesh, as in India.   
 
A critical but less-heralded breakthrough for Grameen was to create a loan product that allowed 
borrowers to repay in small, weekly installments.  This suited poor households well, since they 
could repay out of the regular bits of income coming in daily or near-daily.  Charging appropriate 
interest rates has also helped stem leakage of resources from target populations to those richer or 
politically-favored. On the savings side, BRI has tried to encourage broad access by maintaining 
very low minimum balances (US$0.57) and low minimum deposits for opening accounts. New 
depositors can start an account with 10,000 rupiah (just over US$1), and the new savings 
products have given BRI its most notable success in serving the poor.  On the borrowing side, 
BRI requires borrowers to put up collateral to secure loans, but the bank has chosen to be very 
flexible in what it will accept, so that collateral is not a major constraint when seeking poor 
clients.  A survey completed in 2000, for example, shows that 88% of non-customers had 
acceptable collateral of some sort.  In order to push still further, BRI has instituted products that 
require no collateral at all for loans up to rupiah 2 million (US$225), offered at the discretion of 
the unit manager. 
 
5.1.5 Inclusiveness and competition in the microfinance sector can generate high payoffs 
The inclusiveness of SHG Bank Linkage, which has involved a partnership between government, 
NGOs, and a range of rural banks (commercial banks, RRBs, cooperative banks) has already 
generated a strong payoff.  Further gains in terms of outreach and financial sustainability may be 
reaped through involving private sector banks and MFIs in SHG Banking.  Indeed, recent 
experiments indicate good prospects for scaling-up models that are variations of SHG Banking, 
and involve MFIs as intermediaries between SHGs and private sector banks (who want to enter 
the market, but don’t have the branch network).   
 
Encouraged by early results, the new private sector banks, most notably ICICI Bank, but also UTI 
Bank and HDFC Bank, are actively seeking exposure in the microfinance sector. While their   25
 
current exposure to microfinance is too small to make a difference to their overall portfolio, these 
newer banks are pursuing innovative approaches to microfinance – as a potential business and not 
merely as a social or priority sector lending obligation. Key innovations include a pilot scheme by 
ICICI bank that uses NGOs or MFIs
26, traders, or local brokers (who are close to the farmer by 
the nature of their business), as intermediaries/ ‘service providers’ for loans to groups of small 
and marginal farmers.  The tasks of loan appraisal, processing, management, collection, etc. are 
delegated to the NGO/MFI/intermediary but the loans are always on the books of the bank (ICICI 
funds the borrower directly and the loan does not pass through the NGO/MFIs).  The bank 
provides an initial loan to the NGO/MFI to develop SHGs, but then requires that the NGO/MFI 
repay the loan in a few years and become a viable unit through charging service fees to the groups 
directly.   
 
Banks are also experimenting with an approach now termed the “Integrated Agricultural Service 
Provider” (IASP) approach. One version of this that has been piloted with successful results is the 
ICICI Bank Farmer Service Center operating model (Mahindra Shubhlabh model). Preliminary 
evidence suggests that this model reaches small farmers. Under this model, the bank identifies an 
IASP (Shubhlabh) that has a good relationship with farmers and provides genuine and timely 
information through extension services, and enters into a tripartite agreement with the IASP and 
the output buyer.  Credit is provided to farmers on the recommendation of the IASP, the farmer 
pledges his produce to the output buyer at a market-based price, the IASP provides inputs to the 
farmer.  Loan processing, disbursement and collection are effectively done by the IASP, while the 
credit decision remains nominally with the bank.  At the end of the season, the farmer supplies 
the crop to the output buyer and the output buyer deducts the loan amount from the sale proceeds 
and remits the loan to ICICI Bank in full settlement of the loan amount.  The IASP receives a 
service fee for the loan processing and supervision services (1.5% on recovered loans).  The 
model creates a symbiotic relationship between the input supplier, financier and trader.  This 
reduces transaction costs and the risk exposure of all parties and, therefore, presents a relatively 
low-cost way of serving the rural poor engaged in marginal or smaller farming.  It helps improve 
information collection, reduces credit risk, and increases access to rural financing.   
 
Other variations on this model include trader farmer financing model (Rallis – HLL) in Haryana’s 
Basmati growing area, where Rallis, as an IASP, provides comprehensive field support with 
fortnightly checks and ensures pest control; and farmer financing coupled with insurance model, 
being piloted in Tamil Nadu’s cotton growing area (Appachi).  The latter offers tailor-made 
insurance packages and bulk storage capacity to farmers in order to avoid contamination.   
 
Equally, there is space for independent, specialized MFIs in the Indian microfinance market that 
could provide the necessary competition to SHG Bank Linkage in the area of savings and credit 
provision, and also complement the services provided by SHG bank Linkage.  Evidence from 
elsewhere in Asia, and particularly from Bangladesh and Indonesia, suggests that good, reliable, 
responsive, long-term MFIs for the poor can go a long way in improving access to finance. 
(Morduch and Rutherford, 2003).  India faces a formidable challenge in creating mass-outreach 
retailers of the Grameen or BRI kind. Recent studies also indicate the key role that can be played 
by MFIs that provide composite services, given the wide array of financial transactions (both 
borrowing and lending, often simultaneously, and at all levels of income) that characterize the 
financial life of the poor (Ruthven, 2001; Patole and Ruthven, 2001). The RFAS-2003 also 
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supports this conclusion. The poor are constantly borrowing, lending, saving, withdrawing, using 
and losing money, through contingencies, and calamities.  They need someone to help them with 
all these transactions. Composite service providers are preferable from the viewpoint of reducing 
the number of agencies with whom a poor household must deal, thus reducing transaction costs.  
Moreover, if a composite agency has a good internal MIS, it can use the savings history of a 
household as a “collateral” for loans.  Similarly, if the same agency provides insurance for lives 
or livelihoods, it will be more willing to give a loan.  From the MFIs’ point of view, transaction 
costs come down as the same delivery system can be used, with the addition of training, software 
and some staff.  As discussed above, the growth of the MFI sector is closely related to a more 
conducive policy, legal and regulatory framework.   
 
5.1.6 Overcoming geographic concentration in microfinance   
Another issue of concern is that microfinance in India continues to be skewed in its geographical 
distribution.  The underlying causes for this include the general malaise in the economy of the 
central, eastern and north eastern states, with very little resultant demand for credit among the 
subsistence poor, and the absence (for historical reasons) of good quality NGOs, that are willing 
to initiate microfinance programs in these states (there are a large number of small NGOs but all 
of them with limited experience and outreach) (Mahajan and Ramola, 2003). 
 
Expanding the reach of microfinance to states in central, eastern and north eastern India is not a 
challenge that can be met overnight. To begin with, overall economic growth has to pick up in 
these states. Investments are required in areas such as watershed development, small-scale 
irrigation, livestock up gradation and forest regeneration.  Unfortunately, none of these are 
amenable to the “small, short and unsecured” nature of microcredit loans.  These require long 
term, lumpy public investments. However, once made, they unlock the potential for enhancing 
the livelihoods of millions of poor people, moving them up from subsistence production to 
surplus production and thereby increasing the demand for credit.  One simple example of this is 
the dramatic increase in the demand for credit once irrigation becomes available to erstwhile rain-
fed farmers.    
A proposal for increasing the number of good NGOs in the lesser-served states was made by the 
Tenth Five Year Plan Working Group on Poverty Alleviation Programs (Planning Commission, 
2002), which recommended that well established NGOs be asked to set up branches in selected 
poor districts and that they be funded for this on an assured though declining basis for the first 
three to five years. The experience of the Rashtriya Gramin Vikas Nidhi and the Rashtriya Mahila 
Kosh in supporting hundreds of small NGOs all over the eastern region is useful in this regard 
and lessons from such experience need to be taken into account. Another proposal has been to 
incubate MFIs in poorer districts under the guidance of established MFIs.  This particular 
proposal by BASIX, known as the “3+3+3 program” envisages supporting a local social 
entrepreneur with operating funds and on-lending funds till the operations reach break even in an 
estimated three years.    
 
5.2 Making the Formal Financial Sector Better at Banking for the Poor  
 
There is a view that microfinance can, at minimum, serve as a quick way to deliver finance in the 
interim; the idea is to then graduate microfinance clients to formal finance institutions where they 
can access standard “individual” loans,
27 possibly on a fully commercial basis.  An immediate 
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problem arises in that there are no obvious lenders for SHG or MFI customers to graduate to – 
none yet are close to offering the reliability, convenience, continuity, and flexibility required by 
low-income customers.  Nor is the notion of graduation built explicitly into the design of 
microfinance in India.  In Indonesia, in contrast, Bank Rakyat Indonesia has worked closely with 
(and in fact supervises) the Badan Kredit Desa network, which has for some been a feeder to BRI.  
Even so, there is relatively little graduation overall from the BKDs to BRI, partly because BRI is 
only now developing products that work well for the smallest-scale clients.  In Bangladesh, the 
pretext of graduation has been universally abandoned for lack of an appealing next step—and for 
the desire of NGOs to continue working with clients with whom they have developed 
relationships over many years.   
 
If the idea of graduation is a serious one in India, strong efforts must be made now to reform the 
rural finance markets and institutions (like the commercial banks and the RRBs) with an eye to 
improving the efficiency of the sector and designing services and products appropriate for small 
clients. Indeed, India’s vast network of rural banks potentially presents a tremendous advantage, 
and one on which the country could capitalize in delivering finance for the poor. Over the longer 
term, therefore, efforts to promote microfinance should go hand-in-hand with efforts to make the 
formal sector better at “banking the poor”, and both government and the private sector can play a 
critical role in this context. 
 
An immediate challenge is for formal sector institutions to introduce products and services that 
are not only reliable and available on a continuous basis, but are also flexible and convenient, and 
also to introduce measures that allow for low-cost ways of reaching the rural poor. Here, 
microfinance can offer some useful lessons to formal banks.  Over the medium term, key reforms 
in government policy are required to improve the overall incentive framework, and the regulatory 
and legal system within which rural banks operate, so as to promote greater efficiency and 
competition in rural finance. 
 
5.2.1 Low-cost ways of reaching the rural poor through the formal sector 
Currently, most banks operating in rural areas, the majority of which are state-owned banks, do 
not seem to be tailored to meet the needs of the rural poor in an efficient and effective manner. 
The responsibility for introducing more flexible products and services, that would better match 
the needs of the rural poor, rests with bankers. But Government, given its domination of rural 
finance institutions, also has an important role to play in spearheading change. In this context, 
microfinance offers a number of lessons for formal banks:  
 
Introducing flexible products: Small rural clients prefer to borrow frequently, and repay in small 
installments; banks could usefully explore the possibility of offering new and more flexible loan 
products, like those offered by microfinance.  Increased use by insurance companies, of the large 
and deep branch presence of the postal branch network
28 (as well as the commercial bank 
network) for channeling insurance products, backed by adequate training of staff, could help 
lower transaction costs and improve access to insurance.   
 
The need for composite financial services: While small rural borrowers seek savings and lending 
services, they also seek insurance (life, health, crop); bank branches in rural areas would do well 
                                                                                                                                                                             
financial institution. This is especially true of the very poor, who are often illiterate and ill-equipped to 
maintain a good set of books for anything but the simplest inflexible transactions over short periods. See 
Morduch and Rutherford (2003). 
28 RFAS-2003 data showed that post office branches had the closest proximity (2 kms on average) to rural 
clients compared to branches of commercial banks, RRBs and cooperatives (5 kms on average).    28
 
to explore opportunities to offer composite financial services, as they have begun to do in urban 
areas, and as some microfinanciers have begun to offer in rural and urban areas.  
 
Simplification of procedures to open a bank account, access credit, etc. could also go a long way 
in encouraging the poor to bank with the formal sector, by reducing clients’ transaction costs. The 
KCC experiment is a move in the right direction, but it needs to be scaled-up and accompanied by 
other procedural changes.  
 
Better staffing policies and doorstep banking: The high recovery rates of microfinance are 
associated with staffing policies that allow recruiting staff from the local area who understand 
clients’ needs, and a focus on doorstep banking. State-owned banks operating in rural areas 
currently do not have the flexibility to recruit staff locally, but staffing policies could be revisited. 
Doorstep banking is costly, but the gains from better recovery and cost savings from hiring local 
staff in rural branches could well outweigh the higher transaction costs of doorstep banking.   
 
Use of technology: Banks can use technology to drive down their transaction costs, for example, 
through the introduction of smart cards and biometrics. 
 
5.2.2 Improving the incentive regime, and promoting competition  
Interest rates. One obvious area could be for Government to revisit its policy of setting interest 
rate “caps” on rural lending rates and “floors” on the deposit rates.  As noted above, caps and 
floors have the opposite effect of what is intended – poor borrowers are cut off from access and 
end up paying higher interest rates to informal lenders. Meanwhile, banks face an implicit tax 
(cost) that is not insignificant.  
 
Revisiting the policy on ‘priority sector’ lending. Government should also consider revisiting its 
policy on priority sector lending requirements imposed on banks which, in any case, are not fully 
observed and often circumvented through such means as subscription by banks to NABARD and 
SIDBI bonds. One option, that would allow the most competitive lender to emerge in rural areas 
and minimize distortions, is for government to make the priority lending obligation “tradable”.  
The most competitive lender would then be paid by the less well placed banks to effectively take 
on their priority lending requirements for a price.  Creating such a market for priority lending 
requirements would  benefit both banks and the rural poor, who would be able to access finance 
from the most efficient and competitive institution.  
 
Entry of new private banks in rural finance. Some private banks such as ICICI Bank have shown 
a growing interest in entering India’s rural finance sector—and have introduced innovative 
approaches and financial products to reach the rural poor. Government needs to do what it takes 
to create an environment that would make it possible and profitable for interested private banks to 
enter the rural finance market. This would require liberalizing interest rates (see above) so that 
lending to small, rural clients can become a more profitable business for banks. It would also 
require revisiting branch licensing policies (private banks may be interested in buying up the 
branch networks of the government-owned rural banks). And it would require strengthening the 
supervision of rural banks so as to help wean out the good from the bad banks and create further 
space for new, private sector entrants.  The entry of private banks could have a good 
demonstration effect for the public sector banks on how to reduce transaction costs in rural 
banking and how to make rural banking profitable.  
 
Restructuring the RRBs and rural cooperative banks.  Restructuring the RRBs and rural 
cooperative banks poses a major challenge. Various Government-appointed task forces and 
committees have highlighted what needs to be done to deal with the weaker RRBs and   29
 
cooperative banks; the challenge really is to build consensus for reforms and implement the 
changes. As a first step, the regulation and supervision of these banks needs to be urgently 
strengthened. Prudential regulation standards related to capital adequacy, asset classification, 
income recognition and provisioning need to be upgraded and introduced in a phased manner, and 
the supervisory enforcement improved. Weaknesses in regulatory standards, poor enforcement 
and regulatory forbearance, have undermined market discipline and have contributed to the deep 
financial distress that characterizes many RRBs and cooperatives.  
 
Better regulation and supervision would pave the way for the restructuring of rural banks. It 
would help wean out the adequately capitalized banks from the weaker banks (undercapitalized 
banks, and those that are insolvent). The proper enforcement of prudential norms would mean 
that the weaker banks are forced to address their problems through such means as mergers or 
closures. At the same time, this would need to be accompanied by operational restructuring, 
involving improvements in governance to reduce state interference, better management, staffing 
policies that allow banks to employ local staff who are familiar with the community and thereby 
better able to address the needs of their client, and the introduction of new products, such as loans 
with flexible repayment terms, and better services, such as door-step banking that can help better 
meet the needs of rural clients and minimize risk. In introducing new products and services for 
the rural poor, lessons could be drawn from microfinance. 
 
Beyond these measures, Government can also play an active role in other areas to facilitate 
increased efficiency of rural finance markets. Better laws and regulations governing financial 
transactions, a judiciary that can enforce contracts, the demarcation of property and 
improvements in land titling, better credit information, and an enhanced regulatory, supervisory 
and legal framework to support the development of price insurance products, price derivatives 
instruments and commodities futures markets can go a long way in helping India’s rural poor 
access finance on better terms. 
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